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Abstract
Many democratic countries use district-based elections where there is a “seat” for
each district in the governing body such as parliament or assembly. In each district,
the party whose candidate gets the maximum number of votes is declared the winner
of the corresponding seat. The result of the election is decided based on the number
of seats won this way by the different parties. The electors (or voters) are assigned
to different districts based on their residence, and each elector can vote only in the
district in which they are assigned. Thus, locations of the electors and boundaries of
the districts may severely affect the election result even if the proportion of popular
support (number of electors) of different parties remains unchanged. In this setting,
it is also possible that a party with less number of supporters overall, may end up
winning more seats if their supporters are suitably distributed. This has led to
significant amount of research on the topic of “gerrymandering”, i.e. how districts
may be redrawn or electors may be moved to ensure maximum seats for a particular
party. In this paper, we frame the spatial distribution of electors in a probabilistic
setting, and analyze different models to capture the intra-district polarization of
electors in favour of a party, or the spatial concentration of supporters of different
parties. Our models are inspired by elections in India, where supporters of different
parties tend to be concentrated, turning various districts into strongholds of certain
parties. We show with extensive simulations that our model can capture different
statistical properties of real elections held in India. For this purpose, we frame
parameter estimation problems to fit our models to the observed election results.
Since analytical calculation of the likelihood functions are infeasible for our complex
models, we make use of Likelihood-free Inference methods under the framework of
Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC). Since this approach is highly time-
consuming, we explore how supervised regression using Logistic Regression or Deep
Neural Networks can be used to speed it up. We also explore how the election results
can change drastically by varying the spatial distributions of the voters, even when
the proportions of popular support of the parties remain constant.
1 Introduction
Elections are conducted by almost all democratic countries to choose representatives
for governing bodies, such as parliaments. While there are many kinds of electoral
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systems, a common form is the district-based system in which the country is spatially
divided into a number of regions called districts (or constituencies). There is a
seat in the governing body corresponding to each district. So the residents of each
district elect a representative from a set of candidates, according to any voting rule.
The district representatives thus elected to the governing body, may then form the
government by forming alliances. However, in many countries, the district-level
candidates are actually representatives of political parties, and when the electors
cast their votes, they may do so in favour of the parties, rather than the individual
candidates.
The election results are understood in terms of the number of seats won by
different parties, rather than the total number of votes obtained by them. If the
relative popularity of the different parties is spatially homogeneous across all the
districts, then we can expect the most popular party winning all the seats. But this is
very rarely the case. One reason for this may be the individual popularity of certain
candidates, who are elected from their respective districts irrespective of their party
affiliations. A more complex reason is the spatial variation of demography across the
country, coupled with the fact that the popularity of different parties varies with
demography [2]. Demography varies spatially as people usually prefer to choose
residences based on social identities, such as race, religion, language, caste, profession
and economic status. This process is sometimes called “ghettoization”, where people
with similar social identities huddle together in pockets [4, 5]. Such ghettoization
plays a very important role in district-based elections if different political parties
represent the interests of different social groups. Even if a political party is not
popular overall, it can win a few seats if its supporters are densely concentrated
in a small number of districts, which forms strongholds of the party. On the other
hand, a party which is overall quite popular, may end up failing to win many seats if
its supporters are spread all over without concentration. Additionally, even within
each district, electors often vote not according to individual choice but following
the advice of community leaders, and other local factors [3], which may result in
“polarization” of voters in favour of one or two parties inside each district.
These spatial effects make district-based elections very complex for both politi-
cians and psephologists, for strategy-formation and forecasting/interpretation of re-
sults respectively. Often the relative popularity of parties can be understood through
surveys. But failure to understand the spatial distribution of such popularity limits
the ability to estimate the number of seats that may be won by the parties. Also,
the spatial distribution of popularity is not static over time as people often migrate
and relocate, old electors pass away and young electors get registered. Finally, since
the process of partitioning the country into districts is exogenous to the election
process, the robustness and comprehensiveness of the results are also questionable.
In fact, many countries have the malpractice of “gerrymandering” in which parties
having executive powers try to redefine the districts with the aim of maximizing
their seats in upcoming elections, even without improving their relative popularity.
The number of seats won by the parties should be (almost) invariant to the way in
which districts are drawn up, if the results are to be considered as fair and robust.
The aim of this paper is to build a framework to explore and understand the
influence of the spatial effects mentioned above on the results of elections. Given
the relative popularity of different political parties, we seek to estimate the num-
ber of seats that they may win, while the partitioning of the electors on the basis
of districts is considered as a random process. We consider different probabilistic
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models for this purpose, which are capable of capturing the phenomena like ghet-
toization and local polarization as discussed above. We demonstrate our results on
synthetic data, as well as on real data based on elections in India, which has one
of the most complex electoral processes in the world due to the presence of many
political parties and a highly heterogeneous and layered society where social identi-
ties are deeply interlinked with politics, resulting in spatial heterogeneity in election
results [1]. To fit our models to observed electoral data from India, we explore
the parameter estimation problem. However, the proposed models are “generative-
only”: from which samples can be drawn but analytical computation of likelihood
function is infeasible. So we take the help of likelihood-free inference techniques un-
der the realm of Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC). For this purpose, we
design summary statistics of the election results which are both useful for the ABC
techniques but also useful to understand election results. For one of these models,
there is only one scalar parameter so we can compute its posterior distribution using
simple ABC Rejection Algorithm. However for other models the parameter space
is much larger and so the rejection algorithm is too inefficient. Hence we modify
the ABC Rejection algorithm to make a more focused search. We also explore the
usefulness of regression algorithms based on logistic regression and neural networks
using our sufficient statistics to find a rough estimate of the parameters, from which
the rejection approach can take over.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on spatial
issues in district-based elections (especially gerrymandering), and Likelihood-free
Inference techniques. In Section 3 we discuss our probabilistic models for the spatial
distribution of electors. Section 4 explores parameter estimation for the models
using the ABC framework, while in Section 5 we explore regression techniques for
this purpose. In Section 6 we show the simulation results of our models on synthetic
data, while in Section 7 we carry out an analysis of recent elections in India using
the proposed framework.
2 Related Works
2.1 Elections and Gerrymandering
A significant amount of literature exists in the domain of computational social sci-
ence regarding district-based elections. However, most of these works concentrate
on the topic of gerrymandering - a process of altering the districts to favour one
particular party. The work [8] introduces and examines different algorithms of ma-
nipulating elections, but using a different voting scheme than the one considered
here. The electors are partitioned into two or more groups so that a candidate is se-
lected from each partition, followed by another round of election among the selected
ones, and algorithms are considered for creating such partitions under various con-
straints so that a particular candidate can be guaranteed to win. The works[6, 11]
consider a setting where a subset of an initial set of districts may be retained and the
rest merged, and suggest heuristic algorithms to maximize the number of districts
won by a particular party. The work [7] introduces geometric constraints such as
contiguity in defining districts, and explores the relationship between vote share and
number of districts won in a two-party setting. This is the only work to the best of
our knowledge which explores the issue of spatial distribution of supporters of two
parties, though in a very restricted setting. In the same spirit, the work [9] considers
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the redrawing of districts with the aim of making the election more “competitive”,
i.e. improving the number of seats of the less popular parties, by utilizing the ge-
ometric heterogeneity of vote share. On the other hand, the work [10] considers a
game-theoretic setting in which the electors are rational agents who can relocate to
another district, provided it improves the chances of their preferred outcome.
2.2 Approximate Bayesian Computation and Likelihood-free
Inference
Every stochastic process involves one or more parameters related to conditional
or joint probability distributions. Fitting such models to observations requires us
to estimate these parameters. We may be interested in either point estimates or
a posterior distribution over the parameter space, depending on the application.
However, well-known parameter estimation approaches require us to evaluate the
likelihood function, i.e. the probability that the model, under a given parameter
setting, will be able to generate the observed data. However if the stochastic process
is complicated, then analytically calculating this probability may not be tractable.
In such a situation, we try to carry out likelihood-free inference, by either making an
approximation of the likelihood function or by avoiding the Bayesian equation and
directly estimating the posterior distribution by drawing samples. This approach is
known as Approximate Bayesian Computing (ABC).
One of the earliest known application of likelihood-free inference was in the
domain of ecology [15, 16], where the ABC rejection algorithm was introduced.
This algorithm proceeds by drawing parameter values from a prior distribution,
using that value to run the process simulation, and accept it only if the simulated
outcome was close enough to the observed values. Using the accepted values of the
parameters, a posterior distribution over the parameter space, conditioned on the
observations, can be calculated. Because comparing the outcomes in full details is
often difficult and usually futile, so [17] suggested that only some summary statistics
of the outcomes and observations can be computed and compared. Such summary
statistics may be provided by experts of the process, but may also be estimate in a
data-driven way using neural networks [24].
One major problem of this particular approach is that most of the samples will
be rejected, so that the algorithm will have to run very long till sufficient number
of samples have been collected. Additionally, if each simulation is time-consuming,
then this approach may become infeasible. [25] improvises the algorithm to nav-
igate the parameter space more smartly, so that we can move rapidly towards the
acceptable parameters. Another body of works tries to circumvent the need to sim-
ulate for every parameter sample, and instead tries to predict whether the sample
will be acceptable or not by training a classifier such as logistic regression [19] or by
constructing a synthetic likelihood [20] for the summary statistics mentioned above,
and accepting/rejecting each sample on the basis of the ratios of such likelihood [18].
Another approach look to substitute the rejection process altogether, and replace it
with regression to map the each observation to a parameter value, using something
like a neural network [21, 23, 24]. The data needed to train such neural networks
can be obtained by running the simulation for a range of parameter values.
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3 Model and Analysis
In this section, we first define the notations of our setting, and then proceed to
discuss a series of models for spatial distribution of electors.
3.1 Notation
Let the total number of districts be S. There is one seat in the parliament cor-
responding to each district. The total number of electors is N , and each elector
must register themselves in one district. Let Zi denote the district in which elec-
tor i registers themselves. But each district can have a fixed number of electors,
denoted by {n1, n2 . . . , nS}. Clearly, n1 + n2 + · · · + nS = N . Now, there are K
political parties, and the numbers of their supporters are {v1, v2, . . . , vK}, such that
v1 + v2 + · · ·+ vK = N . The relative vote shares of these parties can be considered
as a K-dimensional discrete distribution, θ. In the subsequent analyses, we consider
all the above quantities except Zi to be fixed and known, unless otherwise stated.
In the electoral setting, let the number of votes polled by the different parties
at any district s be denoted by {Vs1, Vs2, . . . , VsK}. Clearly,
∑K
k=1 Vsk = ns and∑S
s=1 Vsk = vk. In any district s, the winner Ws is that party which receives the
highest number of votes in that district, i.e. Ws = argmaxk(Vs1, Vs2, . . . , VsK). In
each district, the “winning margin” Ps is the fraction of votes won by the winning
party, i.e. Ps =
VsWs
ns
. The number of seats Mk won by any party k is the number
of districts where it is the winner, i.e. Mk =
∑S
s=1 I(Ws = k) (here I denotes the
indicator function).
In the analyses below, Z is considered to be a random variable. V , W , P and
M are also random variables which depend on Z.
3.2 District-wise Polarization Model (DPM)
First of all, we consider the case where in each district the voters choose a party,
based on local popularity. In other words, if nsk electors in district s have already
expressed support for party k, a new elector in that district will choose k based
on nsk, but will also account for its country-wide popularity θk. This model is a
realistic representation of the voting behavior in many countries, where people often
make a trade-off between the local candidate and the top leadership of a party before
choosing to vote for it.
This model is based on the famous Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP) [13] which
is a subset of the CRF considered in the next subsection. The problem with this
model is that, there is no way to ensure that the total number of votes obtained
by the different parties is fixed to some known value. The proportion θ will be
maintained approximately. but not exactly. However, here we can constrain the
total number of votes obtained by each party (v1, . . . , vK), by deactivating the choice
of each party once the number of votes it gets from the different districts, maintained
by book-keeping variable mk, reaches the stipulated value vk. If we denote by Xsi
the vote of the i-th voter in district s, then its distribution is as follows:
prob(Xsi = k) ∝ (γsnsk + (1 − γs)θk)I(mk < vk) (1)
γs is the polarization parameter specific to district s. A high value of γs indicates
that electors in that district tend to choose the locally popular party, with less
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influence of the overall popularity of the parties indicated by θ, and it creates the
possibility of diversity across the districts. If γs is close to 0 in all districts, then the
proportion of votes will reflect θ everywhere, and almost all districts will have the
same winner.
3.3 Elector Community Model (ECM)
This model is based Hierarchical Dirichlet Process (HDP) [12] for grouped data.
The HDP first considers a measure P , which follows the stick-breaking or GEM
distribution. Next, for every data group i, a measure Qi is created from P using a
stick-breaking process. Finally, ni samples are drawn from Qi, as the data-points
associated with the group i. In this case, we can identify each group as a district, and
ns as the number of electors in district s. The base distribution H can be considered
as the overall vote share θ, and Qs is the vote share of the K parties specific to the
district s. Accordingly ns votes are polled for the different parties, as {Vs1, . . . , VsK}
by sampling from the distribution Qs, and the winners are calculated.
This model becomes more interesting and suitable for the voting scenario when
we consider the Chinese Restaurant Franchise (CRF) representation of the HDP,
which is obtained by marginalizing over P and Q. This representation shows that the
“customers” (i.e. data-points) within each group arrange themselves in communities
(clusters), by choosing “tables” in an imaginary Chinese Restaurant, according to a
rule indicated in Equation 2. Then a “dish” is served to each table, across all the
restaurants (i.e. groups), according to Equations 3.
In our setting, the electors within each district first form communities among
themselves (which we denote by C), and then all the members of a community
vote from the same party (denoted by D). The process of community-formation
is analogous to intra-district polarization among the electors. This is a common
feature in the elections of many countries, as people vote according to the influence of
their social communities rather than by individual choice. The communities are not
uniformly sized, rather there are a few big and many small communities, due to the
self-reinforcing (“rich getting richer”) nature of Equation 2. The cluster members
choose a party to vote for, taking into account the voting process across other
districts. Each community tends to vote for a party which is already popular in other
communities. This is also a realistic feature of elections in many countries, where
people have a tendency to vote for that party whom they consider the strongest.
prob(Csi = j) =
nsj
i− 1 + αs
if nsj electors have already joined community j
=
αs
i− 1 + αs
if j is a new community (2)
prob(Dc = k) =
vk + β.θ
c− 1 + β
if vk communities of electors have already voted for party k
(3)
Here, α and β are two parameters of the model. High value of α increases the
polarization within each district, while high value of β creates high polarization
across districts, a situation where a small number of parties account for most of
the votes. Once again, to make sure the parties get votes according to pre-specified
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θ, we modify the second process (Equation 3) so that we can keep a record of the
number of votes obtained by each party as the process proceeds. Once the party
accumulates the votes stipulated for it, the process ensures that it gets no further
votes.
3.4 Party-wise Concentration Model (PCM)
Now we consider a model where each party can choose to distribute it support
across the districts. According to our assumption, each party has the capacity to
win a certain number of votes, based on its popularity proportion. Each party can
campaign in such a way that either its votes get concentrated in a few districts, or
it can be spread across districts.
The effect of this model is to create local concentrations of support in favour
of different parties. Such concentration of support is necessary for parties to be
effective in district-based elections. It is also a realistic phenomena, because support
to political party is often based on social identities, and in most countries people
choose residential areas based on social identities. For this model, we once again use
the Chinese Restaurant Process model as in the District-wise Polarization Model.
But this time we make the process two-step: each person is first assigned to a party,
then (s)he is assigned a district based on concentration of support for that party.
This model conflates party allegiance and social identity, without modeling them
explicitly. Once again, we make sure that the total number of votes obtained by
each party and the capacity of each district is maintained.
prob(Xi = k) ∝ θkI(mk < vk)
prob(Zi = s|Xi = k) ∝ (ηkVsk + (1− ηk)U({1, . . . ,K})I(ls < ns) (4)
Here, mk and ls are book-keeping variables, keeping track of the number of votes
for party k and number of persons in district s at any point.
Like the parameter γs in the previous model, high value of the parameter ηk
encourages voters of party k to concentrate in a few districts, instead of spreading out
uniformly. If all parties have low value of ηk, then once again the vote distribution
in all districts will mirror θ, and the most popular party overall will win all seats.
Concentration of votes is particularly beneficial to parties which are less popular
overall, it allows them to create local strongholds where they can win, even if they
are non-existent elsewhere.
4 Parameter Estimation by Approximate Bayesian
Computation
Clearly, these models have many parameters. If we wish to explain and analyze the
results of actual elections using the models, we need to estimate these parameters.
For parameter estimation, maximum-likelihood and Bayesian approaches are well-
known. But in case of our models it is intractable to get a closed-form expression of
the likelihood function, especially because of the book-keeping variables. So we look
to likelihood-free inference techniques using Approximate Bayesian Computation
(ABC).
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4.1 Summary Statistics
For most ABC approaches, we need a low-dimensional representation of the data-
points using which we wish to compute the posterior approximately. One well-known
way of getting such a low-dimensional representation is by using summary statistics
defined by the user. Various studies in scientific disciplines such as Ecology and
Physics use ABC approaches by defining such statistics specific to the particular
problems they address. In this case, we too define the following summary statistics,
which can be easily calculated from {Vs1, . . . , VsK}, i.e. the number of votes obtained
by each party in each district.
The summary statistics we propose are as follows:
1. Number of districts “won” by each party according to voting rule (K-dim)
2. The mean fraction of votes won by each party across all districts (K-dim)
3. The standard deviation of the fraction of votes won by each party across all
districts (K-dim)
4. The standard deviation of the number of votes won by the parties in each
district (S-dim)
5. The mean and standard deviation of the winning margin across all districts
(2-dim)
Thus, the size of the summary statistics proposed here is (3K +S+2), significantly
less than the size SK of the full data V .
4.2 ABC Rejection Algorithm
The simplest approach for this problem of parameter estimation is the ABC Re-
jection algorithm [16, 18, 19]. Here we sample the model parameters, denoted by
ψ from a suitable prior distribution. Using each sampled paramater value, we run
the simulation and get the result x, from which we calculate the summary statistics
S(x). Next, we compare S(x) with the summary statistics S(x0) computed from
the observed value x0. If they are close enough to each other, then we accept the
sample of the parameters, otherwise we reject it. The process is repeated until we
have a large enough set of samples. Using this set we can compute the posterior
distribution of the parameters by histogram analysis, and the mode of this poste-
rior forms the Maximum a-Posteriori (MAP) estimate ψMAP . On the other hand,
we can find that sample which creates the simulation summary statistics which is
closest to the observed data, and use it as the optimal estimate ψOPT .
The big problem with this approach is that it is very slow, as most samples are
likely to be rejected. That is why, once a sample is accepted, we may consider search-
ing in the neighborhood of the accepted sample rather than sampling again from
the prior. But then we may end up getting stuck at a local optima in the parameter
space. So we use the explore-exploit approach. Here we first draw a limited number
of samples from the prior and choose the best few among them as seeds (explore
phase), and then we draw more samples around them, by using Gaussian distribu-
tion (exploit phase). Like Algorithm 1, we now accept those samples for which the
simulation summary statistics are are close enough to S(x0). On the basis of these
samples, we can calculate ψMAP and ψOPT . We call this as Algorithm 2 or ABC
Explore-Exploit Rejection, which is a modified version of SLAM algorithm [25].
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5 Regression-based approach to Likelihood-free In-
ference
Since rejection-based ABC algorithms are slow, there have been attempts to employ
supervised learning (classification/regression) to find the optimal solutions. Here,
we try out two approaches to estimate the model parameters by posing this as a
regression problem (multivariate regression in case of ECM and PCM) - logistic
regression and neural networks.
For this purpose, we first generate a training set by drawing N samples of the
model parameters {yi}
N
i=1, and also the popularity proportion θ of the parties, the
number of electors N and number of districts S. Once we have a fairly diverse
but representative set of samples, we run the models on them, to get the outputs V .
Using N , S, θ, V we construct the feature vectors {xi}
N
i=1, along with the parameters
as corresponding output values {yi}
N
i=1. Using this training set, we are now ready
for the regression.
5.1 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a method for probabilistic classification. In this case, we utilize
it to solve our regression problem by using it in the form of the bisection method.
Given any feature vector x (simulation details) and a model parameter estimate y′,
the aim is to predict whether the correct parameter value y (by which the model
can produce the result encoded in x from the input encoded in x) is greater than
y′ or not. Clearly this is a binary classification task, which can be done by logistic
regression. Depending on the classifier’s prediction, we shift y′ either above or below
its current value, midway within the feasible region (for example γ of DPM and η of
PCM must lie in (0, 1)). The feasible region also shrinks at each step, as in a decision
tree. We continue this process till y′ converges. For every test value y′, we train the
logistic regression classifier on the training set by re-labeling all samples based on
sign(y − y′). This is not a time-consuming process and can be done on-the-fly. If
the model has multiple parameters (ECM and PCM), we do this separately for all
parameters. It is a simplistic but efficient and interpretable approach.
5.2 Neural Networks
The next approach to regression which we consider is Deep Neural Network. In
this case we do not need the bisection method as the neural network itself can
produce real vector outputs. We tried with several architectures, and found the
optimal one to have two dense layers with 33 and 38 hidden units (when the input
is 24-dimensional along with feature scaling) along with 20% drop-out and Scaled
Exponential Linear Unit (SELU) and Adam optimizer.
5.3 Regression-Rejection Hybrid Approach
We tried both the approaches mentioned above (Logistic Regression and Neural
Network) on the real-world data mentioned in Section 7. Unfortunately, neither
of the above approaches could produce optimal values of the desired parameters.
Though they came quite close to the optimal values, in these models even a small
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Number of seats won by Party 1 St. Dev. of votes for Party 1
θ1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
γ = 0.25 50± 3 100 100 100 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
γ = 0.50 50± 3 100 100 100 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
γ = 0.75 50± 3 96± 2 100 100 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
γ = 0.90 50± 3 72± 3 83± 3 93± 2 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18
γ = 0.99 50± 3 60± 3 70± 2 80± 2 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.29
Table 1: Synthetic results in a two-party election under different parameter settings
(shown in the rows) under District-wise Polarization Model, showing number of seats won
by party 1 (whose popularity is indicated for each column) and the standard deviation
of its votes across the districts.
change in the parameter values can have an effect on the results, as demonstrated
on synthetic data in Section 6.
Hence, we advocate a hybrid approach, which combines both regression and rejec-
tion. We propose to replace the “explore” phase of Algorithm 2 with the regression-
based approach, to get an estimate called SEED. The covariance matrix around
SEED can be provided by the user. The exact value of the parameters can then be
found by sampling around SEED.
6 Analysis of Models through Simulation
In this section, we illustrate through simulations various aspects of our models on
synthetic data. We consider a simple 2-party system. Keeping the number of dis-
tricts S = 100 and number of electors N = 1000000, we vary the popularity pro-
portion θ, and observe the results under different settings of the parameters of our
models. For each setting, we carry out 100 simulations and report: i) The mean
number of seats won by the parties, and ii) The mean and variance of winning
margins.
Observations:District-wise Polarization Model
1. Increase of polarization usually helps the less popular party to increase its seat
share
2. Increase of polarization increases the mean margin of victory in the districts
(not shown in the table)
3. Increase of polarization increases the variance in the number of votes obtained
by it across the districts
Observations:Elector Community Model
1. Increase in the community parameter α creates smaller communities, which
benefits the more popular party
2. Increase in the concentration parameter β benefits the party that is less pop-
ular.
3. High values of both parameters increase uncertainty of the results
4. Low values of α, forms large communities and increases margins of victory
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Number of seats won by Party 1 Mean Winning Margin
θ1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
{α = 1, β = 0.25} 50± 4 62± 5 73± 4 84± 3 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.88
{α = 1, β = 0.75} 51± 4 63± 5 71± 4 80± 3 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.89
{α = 1, β = 0.99} 51± 3 61± 3 70± 2 79± 2 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.93
{α = 5, β = 0.25} 50± 4 72± 4 89± 3 97± 2 0.64 0.66 0.72 0.80
{α = 5, β = 0.75} 48± 7 69± 8 83± 6 94± 4 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.81
{α = 5, β = 0.99} 49± 9 64± 9 70± 9 84± 8 0.69 0.85 0.88 0.89
{α = 10, β = 0.25} 51± 5 80± 4 95± 2 100 0.60 0.63 0.70 0.80
{α = 10, β = 0.75} 47± 12 75± 11 90± 5 96± 4 0.65 0.66 0.72 0.80
{α = 10, β = 0.99} 50± 12 66± 12 73± 14 84± 10 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.88
Table 2: Synthetic results in a two-party election under different parameter settings
(shown in the rows) under Elector Community Model, showing number of seats won by
party 1 (whose popularity is indicated for each column) and the average winning margin.
Number of seats won by Party 1 Mean Winning Margin
θ1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
{η1 = 0.5, η2 = 0.5} 51± 3 100 100 100 0.51 0.60 0.70 0.80
{η1 = 0.5, η2 = 0.7} 55± 5 100 100 100 0.52 0.60 0.70 0.80
{η1 = 0.5, η2 = 0.99} 50± 3 71± 2 90± 2 99 0.63 0.65 0.72 0.80
{η1 = 0.7, η2 = 0.5} 46± 3 100 100 100 0.53 0.60 0.70 0.80
{η1 = 0.7, η2 = 0.7} 50± 4 99± 1 100 100 0.53 0.60 0.70 0.80
{η1 = 0.7, η2 = 0.99} 49± 4 71± 3 89± 2 98± 1 0.63 0.66 0.71 0.80
{η1 = 0.99, η2 = 0.5} 51± 2 75± 2 94± 1 100 0.63 0.64 0.71 0.80
{η1 = 0.99, η2 = 0.7} 51± 2 77± 3 91± 2 100 0.63 0.65 0.71 0.80
{η1 = 0.99, η2 = 0.99} 48± 2 64± 2 81± 2 92± 1 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.82
Table 3: Synthetic results in a two-party election under different parameter settings
(shown in the rows) under Partywise Concentration Model, showing number of seats
won by party 1 whose popularity is indicated for each column, and also the winning
margins
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Observations: Partywise Concentration Model
1. If both parties have nearly equal popularity, a party should have either very
low or very high concentration relative to the other, to maximize its seat share.
2. If there is a significant gap in popularity between the parties, increasing con-
centration of support is good for the less popular party, but bad for the more
popular party.
3. Increase in concentration of support for any party increases the variance in the
number of votes obtained by it across the districts (not shown in the table)
The results presented show that the part which is more popular overall, usually
has an extra advantage in terms of seats won, i.e. the proportion of seats won by
them usually exceeds their proportion of popularity (vote share). However, it is
possible for the smaller party to offset this disadvantage in certain circumstances.
In case of DPM, high value of γ causes the supporters to concentrate in space, and
the seat-share reflects the vote share. In case of ECM, we see that as α and β both
increase, the less popular party starts punching above its weight, i.e. its seat-share
approaches and may even exceed its vote-share.
7 Analysis of Indian Elections
Finally, we attempt to understand actual elections held in India over the last 10
years. We use the hybrid regression-rejection algorithm discussed earlier to find the
optimal parameters to fit each model to each election. We also explore alternative
results to these elections, under the same proportion of popularity, but different
parameter settings. Due to the volatile nature of the subject, we anonymize the
political parties.
We consider the Indian province of Delhi National Capital Region (NCR), whose
local governing body has 70 seats. Around 9 million people (on average) participate
in the elections, with roughly equal distribution of electors across the 70 districts.
Since 2013, 5 elections have taken (local and national) in which 3 main political
parties have competed, along with small parties and independent candidates. The
overall vote-shares (popularity proportions) of the parties have varied across the
elections.
In the Table 3, we show the expected results according to our models, and
compare them with the actual results for the local assembly elections of 2013, 2015
and 2020. Due to lack of space, only two parameter settings are shown: default
and optimal. Optimal setting is the one which is estimated using the Approximate
Bayesian technique discussed in the previous section. The names of the parties have
been anonymized. In Table 4, we use the optimal parameter settings estimated in
Table 3 for the local elections to extrapolate the national election results of 2014
and 2019.
The results show that Elector Community Model is most successful in repro-
ducing the actual results, closely followed by the Partywise Concentration Model.
It is also seen that the results can be considerably different under other parameter
settings, such as the default settings used in each case. In Table 4, it is interesting
to note that although all the models could roughly predict the results for the 2014
national elections using the optimal parameters estimated from the three assembly
elections, none could do so for the 2019 national elections.
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Party A Party B Party C MWM SWM
2013θ 0.30 0.33 0.25 NA NA
Proportional 21 23 18
SPM(γ = 0.89) 25 35 10 0.37 0.07
SPM(γ = 0.99) 21 24 18 0.55 0.18
ECM({α = 16, β = 0.24}) 28 34 8 0.39 0.07
ECM({α = 1, β = 0.99}) 21 23 18 0.77 0.19
EMM(η = {0.55, 0.89, 0.84}) 27 34 9 0.36 0.09
EMM(η = {0.99, 0.99, 0.99}) 24 28 18 0.51 0.11
Actual 28 34 8 0.39 0.06
2015θ 0.54 0.32 0.10 NA NA
Proportional 38 22 7 NA NA
DPM(γ = 0.86) 68 2 0 0.54 0.09
DPM(γ = 0.99) 37 23 4 0.71 0.21
ECM({α = 30, β = 0.21}) 67 3 0 0.55 0.07
ECM({α = 1, β = 0.99}) 38 23 7 0.87 0.17
PCM(η = {0.74, 0.89, 0.68} 67 3 0 0.54 0.05
PCM(η = {0.99, 0.99, 0.99} 49 19 2 0.64 0.14
Actual 67 3 0 0.55 0.07
2020θ 0.54 0.39 0.05 NA NA
Proportional 37 27 4 NA NA
DPM(γ = 0.87) 60 10 0 0.55 0.08
DPM(γ = 0.99) 38 28 4 0.73 0.18
ECM({α = 36, β = 0.57}) 62 8 0 0.55 0.06
ECM({α = 1, β = 0.99}) 40 25 4 0.85 0.17
PCM(η = {0.72, 0.80, 0.72}) 62 8 0 0.55 0.08
PCM(η = {0.99, 0.99.0.99}) 43 27 0 0.66 0.13
Actual 62 8 0 0.55 0.06
Table 4: Elections in Delhi-NCR, India: The actual and model-predicted performances
of 3 top parties in past 3 assembly elections (2013, 2015, 2020), based on their popularity
proportions (vote share). For each model, results are shown with the default parameters
as well as optimal settings as computed by Hybrid Regression-Rejection Algorithm. In
each election, the number of seats won by each party under various settings is compared
with the seats proportional to their vote share, and the cases where a party gains seats
are highlighted
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Party A Party B Party C MWM SWM
2014θ 0.33 0.46 0.15 NA NA
Proportional 23 32 11
DPM(estimated) 10± 4 60±4 0 0.47 0.09
DPM(γ = 0.99) 24 33 10 0.65 0.2
ECM(estimated) 13± 3 57±3 0 0.48 0.08
ECM({α = 1, β = 0.99}) 23 31 12 0.85 0.18
PCM(estimated) 8± 3 62±3 0 0.47 0.1
PCM(η = {0.99, 0.99, 0.99}) 23 43 4 0.58 0.13
Actual 10 60 0
2019θ 0.18 0.56 0.23 NA NA
Proportional 13 39 16
DPM(estimated) 1 68 1 0.56 0.11
DPM(γ = 0.99) 12 41 16 0.70 0.22
ECM(estimated) 0 69 1 0.56 0.08
ECM({α = 1, β = 0.99}) 12 39 17 0.83 0.17
PCM(η = {0.7, 0.95.0.9}) 0 70 0 0.56 0.11
PCM(η = {0.99, 0.99.0.99}) 6 52 12 0.62 0.15
Actual 0 65 5
Table 5: Elections in Delhi-NCR, India: The actual and model-predicted performances of
3 top parties in past 2 parliamentary elections (2014 and 2019), based on their popularity
proportions (vote share). For each model, results are shown with the default parameters
as well as the parameters estimated by ABC Explore-Exploit Rejection algorithm from
the 3 assembly elections, as shown in the previous table. In each election, the number of
seats won by each party under various settings is compared with the seats proportional
to their vote share, and the cases where a party gains seats are highlighted
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the effects of spatial distribution of electors on the re-
sults of district-based elections. We considered 3 stochastic models for such spatial
distribution, based on the observations that i) an individual’s vote is influenced by
overall popularity of parties, ii) people tend to vote for parties based on their so-
cial identity/community affiliation, and iii) people with similar social identity tend
to live geographically close. We saw that these factors allow political parties to
establish certain districts as their strongholds, and thus they may be able to win
disproportionately more seats in the governing body, even if their popularity is less
in the overall population. We also explored the parameter estimation problem for
the proposed models, and for this we designed algorithms based on Approximate
Bayesian Computation as well as regression. In future work, we would like to i) con-
sider more sophisticated and realistic models of spatial distribution of electors, ii) use
this framework to study more elections in various countries which have district-based
voting system, iii) collaborate with psephologists to understand how the parameters
vary from one election to another.
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